A Comparative Study of Venture Capital Performance in the US and Europe by Xu, Xiaoqing Eleanor
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 9
Issue 3 Fall 2004 Article 6
December 2004
A Comparative Study of Venture Capital
Performance in the US and Europe
Xiaoqing Eleanor Xu
Seton Hall University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Xu, Xiaoqing Eleanor (2004) "A Comparative Study of Venture Capital Performance in the US and Europe," Journal of Entrepreneurial
Finance and Business Ventures: Vol. 9: Iss. 3, pp. 61-76.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol9/iss3/6
 
 
 
A Comparative Study of Venture Capital  
Performance in the US and Europe 
 
 
 
Xiaoqing Eleanor Xu, Ph.D. 
*
 
Seton Hall University
**
 
 
 
 
For the past fifty years in the United States, venture capital (VC) has provided initial 
funding to innovative entrepreneurial enterprises, while the European venture capital industry 
has only really emerged over the past decade.  Using quarterly data from 1993 to 2003, this 
paper examines and compares the return and risk performance of venture capital funds in US 
and Europe.  Several results are noteworthy.  First, pooled venture capital returns in US and 
Europe are 3.273% and 0.765% (on a quarterly basis) above the CAPM market risk-adjusted 
returns, respectively.  Second, US venture capital fund performance dominates that of Europe 
in all measures: mean return, total-risk adjusted return, and market-risk adjusted return.  Third, 
the linkage between US VC fund performance and the US stock market is much stronger than 
the co-movement between the European VC and European stock market.  Finally, the 
introduction of Euro.NM in 1997 has substantially enhanced the relationship between the 
venture capital and stock market performance in Europe.   
 
I. Introduction 
Venture capital funds have traditionally invested in new and rapidly growing enterprises 
that do not yet have access to the public equity market or debt market.  For the past 50 years in 
the United States, venture capital (VC) has provided initial funding to companies like Microsoft, 
Apple, Intel, Lotus, Sun Microsystems, Federal Express, and has established itself as the 
“engine” for innovative entrepreneurial enterprises.  The success of many VC-backed 
innovations, in turn, has generated tremendous returns for venture capital funds in the US.  
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Such returns, however, are generally associated with higher risk, lower liquidity, longer 
investment horizon, and higher information asymmetry than the public equity investments. 
Venture capital funds specialize in long-term private equity investments in startup and 
super-growth companies that offer high potential returns and substantial risk.   Since venture 
capital investments are made in non-publicly traded companies that are characterized by a high 
level of information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, venture capitalists are 
actively involved in monitoring, strategic management, planning and decision-making of the 
portfolio companies they fund.  Venture capitalists usually provide capital infusion in well-
defined stages tied to significant development of the company’s products, market and 
profitability.  In addition, venture capitalists typically take an active role in guiding an exit 
decision, such as initial public offerings or mergers and acquisitions.   
By comparison with US, venture capitalism in Europe is still underdeveloped.  A 
decade ago, Europe was substantially lagged behind the US in providing a nurturing 
environment for innovative entrepreneurial activity, with small and medium enterprises often 
finding it difficult to get started and grow due to the lack of “risk capital”.  The European 
venture capital industry has only really emerged over the past decade, especially in UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden.  The recent development of the venture capital 
industry in Europe, to some extent, has been inspired by the success of VC-backed innovations 
in the US.  The growing integration of Europe in terms of international trade, currency and 
monetary policy has enhanced the competitiveness of European Economy and further 
encouraged the development of venture financing across Europe. 
The objective of this paper is to examine and compare the performance of venture 
capital funds in US and Europe for the past decade.  Our study is important for two reasons.  
First, despite its remarkable growth of VC in Europe in the past ten years, there is still a lack of 
empirical work in the European venture capital industry.  According to Thompson Financial, in 
2003, 29 billion (Euros) of venture capital were invested in Europe, while only 18 billion (US 
dollars) VC were invested in the US.  In terms of funding commitments, 20 billion (US dollars) 
were raised in US, less than the 27 billion (Euros) raised in Europe.  These latest industry 
statistics illustrate the growing significance of the European VC industry and the immediate 
need to understand its performance.  A few existing studies on the European VC industry (see 
Healy [1991], Sapienza, Manigart, and Vermeir [1995], and Martin, Sunley, and Turner [2002]) 
are descriptive in nature and largely focused on the structure and raw statistics of the industry. 
Second, despite the importance of venture capital in entrepreneurial financing, very 
little attention has been paid to risk and return performance of this alternative investment 
vehicle.  Prior research in the US and UK venture capital industry, pioneered by Barry et al. 
[1990], Lerner [1994, 1995], Gompers [1995, 1996, 2000], Gompers and Lerner [1998, 1999], 
and Brav and Gompers [1997], has examined the economics of the venture capital cycle 
(including venture capital fundraising, investing, and exiting), focusing on the mechanics of the 
venture capital industry.  Available evidence on the investment performance of venture capital 
funds has been limited to a small number of descriptive studies (Bygrave and Tymmons [1992], 
Wright and Robbie [1998], and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson [2000]) and some raw 
figures on Investment Horizon Performance produced by Venture Economics.   Exhibit 1 
illustrates aggregate source of VC in US and Europe for the past two decades.   While pension 
funds (21.2%) and endowments (18%) play a dominant role in supplying capital to venture 
capital funds in the US, corporations (20%) and Banks (18.2%) represent the largest 
institutional investors in European VCs.  The US is certainly more investment driven and less 
 63 
bank-centered in comparison with Europe (see Black [1998]).  High net-worth individuals are 
important sources of capital for venture capital, but the dominant venture capital investors are 
clearly the institutional investors.  This is true in both US and Europe, although their sources of 
VC institutional funding are dramatically different.  Given that most institutional investors 
invest in public equity through the stock market and diversify their portfolios by investing in 
venture capital funds, the market risk-adjusted performance of venture capital funds in US or 
Europe should be of great concern to global institutional investors. 
 
II. Data 
Data on the US and European venture capital funds are obtained from the Venture 
Economics database.  We use the time-weighted quarterly returns from 1993 to 2003 in 
comparing the risk and return characteristics of VC funds in US and Europe.
1
  Time-weighted 
return calculates a return for each quarter using net asset value at the beginning and end of 
period and cash flows to and from the fund’s investors between periods.  Capital contributions 
(also called “takedowns” or “capital calls”) are treated as negative cash flows, while 
distributions are treated as positive cash flows.  The Net Asset value (NAV) reflects the value 
of the portfolio companies and is net of fees and carried interest and treated as terminal value.   
Since portfolio companies of venture capital funds are not traded in the market, periodic NAVs 
and returns are heavily dependent on valuations.  These returns are also under the assumptions 
that money can come and go freely at the beginning and end of each period, although in 
practice, venture capital funds are illiquid investments with a typical investment horizon of 7 
to10 years.  When a venture capital fund cashes out of a certain portfolio company through an 
IPO or acquisition by another company, it is called exit or divestment.  Successful venture 
capital exits through IPOs and M&As bring returns and liquidity to a venture capital fund, but 
it is still much more illiquid relative to public equity portfolio with securities traded in the 
secondary market.    
 Three types of time-weighted returns are obtained from Venture Economics: pooled 
(portfolio return by pooling cash flows across all sample funds during the period), average 
(arithmetic mean return across all sample funds during the period), capital-weighted (portfolio 
return weighted by fund size).  The pooled return is calculated by treating all funds as a single 
"fund" by summing their monthly cash flows together. This cash flow series is then used to 
calculate a rate of return. This method implicitly would create an investment-weighted return 
and most closely matches the method that many investors used in measuring the return on their 
portfolio.  Similar to a market-value weighted index in the equity market, this pooled method is 
considered the most appropriate method for presenting the aggregate performance of private 
equity funds. 
For stock market benchmarks, we use the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) 
indices that match the venture capital funds’ target markets.  MSCI indices are widely used 
benchmarks for global portfolio managers. MSCI uses a consistent and transparent index 
construction and maintenance methodology, ensuring accurate representation of each country 
or region's underlying industry group distribution and market capitalization.  The quarterly 
MSCI US gross return index (including both price return and dividend return) and MSCI 
Europe gross return index are used as the stock market return indicators in this study. 
Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the U.S. and European venture capital 
funds and public equity indices.  The mean pooled VC return in the US, is 4.86% on a quarterly 
                                                 
1
 We exclude earlier data due to the small sample size of European VC funds prior to 1993. 
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basis from 1993 to 2003.  This is more than 4 times the corresponding VC return average 
(1.15%) in Europe.  However, the standard deviation of pooled VC return in the US is only 1.3 
times the standard deviation in Europe, resulting in a US VC Sharpe ratio that is more than 
three times higher than that in Europe.  Although pooled, average and capital-weighted VC 
returns offer different statistics, the resulted Sharpe ratios computed based on all three methods 
(see Table III) show that the US VC returns have higher Sharpe ratios in comparison with 
Europe during the same period.    
Table IV describes the investment horizon performance of US and European VC funds 
as of December 2003.  On a raw return basis, the five-year, ten-year and twenty-year 
investment horizon performance of US VC funds is significantly better than that of the 
European VC or the US stock market.  The three-year investment horizon performance of US 
VC, however, is worse than either the European counterpart or the US stock market.  Table V 
presents the correlation matrix between VC returns and stock market returns in both US and 
Europe.  The US VC returns show a much stronger correlation with the public equity market 
returns than the case in Europe.   
 
III. Model and Empirical Results 
 Our analysis of venture capital performance uses three models for comparison.   
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where Rjt is the excess return on venture capital fund index j in quarter t and Rm is the excess 
return on the market benchmark index. D is a dummy variable that equals -1 during the 
declining markets (i.e., Rm < 0) and 0 otherwise.   
Model 1 is the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which conditions the 
excess return of the venture capital fund on the excess return of the overall stock market index.  
Model 2 is the market-timing model developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Merton 
(1981), to separate fund managers’ broad market macro-forecasting (market-timing) ability 
from their micro-forecasting (security selection) ability.  Model 2 is widely used in researches 
on the mutual fund and hedge fund performance [Henriksson (1984) and Fung, Xu and Yau 
(2002)].  Model 3 is the adjusted CAPM model with an added autoregressive (AR) term. 
 Table VI reports the regression results for the above three models.   Panels A and B 
present the model estimates for venture capital funds in US and Europe, respectively. The US 
pooled venture capital excess returns have a highly significant and positive beta (0.839) with 
the stock market excess returns, while the market risk-adjusted excess return (alpha) is 3.273% 
for the pooled venture capital returns.  Results from European VC in Panel B show a different 
pattern.   The beta with the Europe MSCI stock market index is only 0.293, while the alpha is 
only 0.765%.  Although the regression estimates vary when using the average or capital-
weighted VC returns, the relative pattern between US and European VC performance are robust 
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regardless of the computation method:  US dominates Europe in both market-risk adjusted 
return and co-movement with the stock market.  
 Estimates from model 2 indicate that the venture capital funds in the US are not 
significantly different in its co-movement with the stock market during up and down markets, 
as evidenced by the insignificant β2 estimates.  The European VC returns, however, show 
marginally negative market timing performance as evidenced by the negative and slightly 
significant β2 coefficients.   Model 3 estimates indicate that the VC fund excess returns have 
positive first order autocorrelation in both US and Europe, with the exception of the pooled US 
VC excess returns.  This autocorrelation pattern could be largely induced by the illiquid nature 
of VC capital investments.   
 The launch of the “new market (nm)” for European public equity capital, formally 
called Euro.NM, was launched in 1997.  The Euro.NM, similar to that of NASDAQ in the US, 
is a circuit of stock exchanges that intend to attract the listing of growth and innovative high-
tech company stocks.  The development of Euro.NM has spurred the development of VC in 
Europe and provided a better environment for venture capital funds to exit their investments to 
the public equity market through IPOs.  We hypothesize that the VC performance in the post-
Euro.NM period be more closely tied to the public equity market, in comparison with the pre-
Euro.NM period.  
 To test the above hypothesis, we split the sample in to pre- (1993-1997) and post- 
(1997-2003) Euro.NM periods. Table VII shows a dramatic difference in VC betas between the 
two periods in Europe.  The European VC return has insignificant relationship with the stock 
market return in the pre-Euro.NM period, while the relationship is very strong in the post-
Euro.NM period.  Such pattern is robust regardless of the use of pooled, average or capital-
weighted European VC returns.  Same split sample analysis is performed on the US, but no 
significant difference between the two periods can be found in terms of comovement between 
VC and stock market returns.  This is consistent with expectation since NASDAQ has been in 
existence long before the start of the sample period. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Using quarterly data from 1993 to 2003, this paper examines and compares the return 
and risk performance of venture capital funds in US and Europe.  Several results are 
noteworthy.  First, pooled venture capital returns in US and Europe are 3.273% and 0.765% (on 
a quarterly basis) above the CAPM risk-adjusted returns, respectively.  As noted in Xu (2004), 
these results may be subject to biases due to potential income smoothing in the reporting 
process, illiquidity of private equity investments, and heterogeneity of fund returns.  
 Second, during the sample period, the US venture capital fund performance dominates 
that of Europe in all return performance measures: mean return, total-risk adjusted return 
(Sharpe ratio), and market-risk adjusted return (alpha).  Figure 1 illustrates the efficient 
allocation between public equity and venture capital (private equity) in US and Europe.  The 
optimal risky portfolio in US includes 66.78% venture capital and 33.22% public equity if 
investors are able to realize the pooled VC return, whereas the VC portion is only 25.7% in an 
optimal risky portfolio in Europe. 
Third, our study indicates that the linkage between US VC fund performance and the 
US stock market is much stronger than the co-movement between excess returns on European 
VC and European stock market.  Further analysis shows that the introduction of Euro.NM 
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(high-tech friendly stock market in Europe) in 1997 has substantially enhanced the relationship 
between the private and public equity performance in Europe.   
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Table I 
Source of Venture Capital Funds in US and Europe (1980 to 2003) 
 
Investor Type US   Europe   
Banks 7.2% 18.2% 
Insurance Companies 5.8% 7.0% 
Corporations 15.5% 20.0% 
Pension Funds 21.2% 14.8% 
Individuals 15.9% 15.4% 
Endowments 18.0% 3.7% 
Intermediaries 7.5% 13.8% 
Foreign Investors 4.6% 2.8% 
Others 4.3% 4.3% 
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Table II 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Venture Capital Returns: 1993-2003 
 
Statistics 
Pooled 
Fund 
Return 
Average 
Fund 
Return 
Capital-
weighted 
Fund 
Return 
Risk 
Free 
Rate 
Stock 
Market 
Return 
Pooled 
Fund  
Excess 
Return 
Average 
Fund  
Excess 
Return 
Capital-
weighted 
Fund 
Excess 
Return 
Stock 
Market 
Excess 
Return 
 
Panel A.  US   
Mean 5.85 1.53 2.38 1.00 3.02 4.86 0.53 1.38 2.03 
Std Dev 14.30 6.93 7.49 0.40 8.64 14.14 6.74 7.30 8.61 
Skewness 2.23 0.01 0.23 -0.78 -0.35 2.28 0.00 0.25 -0.31 
Kurtosis 9.66 0.73 0.70 -0.79 0.23 9.98 0.90 0.83 0.14 
Median 4.80 2.00 3.70 1.15 3.50 3.85 1.27 2.45 2.30 
Minimum -16.60 -13.20 -11.90 0.23 -17.27 -18.04 -14.64 -12.56 -17.68 
Maximum 71.70 21.10 24.80 1.50 21.90 70.40 19.80 23.50 20.80 
 
Panel B. Europe   
Mean 2.25 0.65 0.55 1.10 2.92 1.15 -0.45 -0.55 1.82 
Std Dev 10.92 6.73 7.28 0.45 10.10 10.74 6.51 7.07 10.05 
Skewness 0.53 0.39 0.15 -0.72 -0.50 0.51 0.43 0.18 -0.46 
Kurtosis 0.86 -0.62 -0.63 -0.91 0.76 0.99 -0.53 -0.59 0.64 
Median 1.30 0.00 0.40 1.30 3.79 -0.08 -1.07 -0.99 2.44 
Minimum -22.30 -10.80 -13.30 0.26 -23.80 -23.68 -11.58 -13.64 -24.24 
Maximum 35.10 14.50 16.10 1.68 23.28 33.74 12.97 14.67 21.76 
 
 
Note: All statistics are in percentage. Excess Returns are computed as raw returns minus the 
risk free rate. 
 
 
 
Table III 
 
Sharpe Ratios of Quarterly Venture Capital Returns: 1993-2003 
 
 
Pooled 
VC Fund 
Average  
VC Fund 
Capital-
weighted  
VC Fund 
Stock 
Market   
 
US 0.34 0.08 0.19 0.24 
 
Europe 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 0.18 
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Table IV 
Investment Horizon Performance as of December 2003 
 
 3-year 5-year 10-year 20-year 
 
US Venture Capital -16.9 24.7 25.8 15.6 
 
MSCI – US Stock Index -4.2 -1.2 11.2 13.0 
 
European Venture Capital -9.0 2.3 8.3 7.2 
 
MSCI – Europe Stock Index -10.6 -1.8 7.6 11.8 
 
 
Venture Capital Funds - 
Investment Horizon Performance as of December 2003
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0
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Note: All statistics are in percentage. 
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Table V 
 
Correlation Matrix: 1993-2003 
 
 
US 
VC 
Pooled  
Excess 
Return 
US VC 
Average 
Excess 
Return 
US VC 
Capital 
Weighted 
Excess 
Return 
US  
Stock 
Market 
Return 
European 
VC 
Pooled  
Excess 
Return 
European 
VC 
Average 
Excess 
Return 
European 
VC 
Capital 
Weighted 
Excess 
Return 
Europe 
Stock 
Market 
Return 
US VC Pooled Excess 
Return 1        
US VC Average Excess 
Return 0.91** 1       
US VC Capital 
Weighted 
Excess Return 0.92** 0.97** 1      
US Stock Market 
Return 0.51** 0.59** 0.60** 1     
European VC Pooled 
Excess Return 0.60** 0.64** 0.64** 0.33** 1    
European VC Average 
Excess Return 0.63** 0.71** 0.67** 0.31** 0.70** 1   
European VC Capital 
Weighted Excess 
Return 0.68** 0.78** 0.74** 0.33** 0.76** 0.91** 1  
Europe Stock Market 
Return 0.52** 0.58** 0.57** 0.88** 0.27* 0.33** 0.37** 1 
 
** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% 
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Table VI 
 
Relationship between Venture Capital Excess Return  
and Benchmark Stock Market Excess Return 
 
 
)3(RRaR:3Model
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where Rjt is the excess return on venture capital fund index j in quarter t and Rm is the excess 
return on the market benchmark index. D is a dummy variable that equals -1 during the 
declining markets (i.e., Rm < 0) and 0 otherwise.   
 
Panel A: US Venture Capital Quarterly Returns: 1993-2003 
 
 
Dependent Variable: US Venture Capital Fund Index Excess Return  (Pooled) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 3.273* 0.839**   14.48** 24.3% 
 (1.68) (3.81)     
Model 2 4.210 0.712* -0.274  7.16** 22.7% 
 (1.34) (1.78) (-0.38)    
Model 3 2.704 0.842**  0.314 8.43** 26.1% 
 (1.38) (3.87)  (1.42)   
 
Dependent Variable: US Venture Capital Fund Index Excess Return  (Average) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 -0.364 0.460**   21.58** 32.9% 
 (-0.42) (4.65)     
Model 2 1.553 0.200 -0.561*  13.04** 36.4% 
 (1.15) (1.16) (-1.82)    
Model 3 -0.803 0.463**  0.242** 15.54** 40.9% 
 (-0.96) (4.98)  (2.56)   
 
Dependent Variable: US Venture Capital Fund Index Excess Return  (Capital-weighted) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 0.413 0.508**   23.01** 34.4% 
 (0.44) (4.80)     
Model 2 1.875 0.310 -0.428  12.48** 35.3% 
 (1.27) (1.64) (-1.27)    
Model 3 -0.045 0.511**  0.253** 16.06** 41.8% 
 (-0.05) (5.12)  (2.49)   
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Table VI (Continued) 
 
 
Panel B: European Venture Capital Quarterly Returns: 1993-2003  
 
Dependent Variable: European VC Capital Fund Index Excess Return  (Pooled) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 0.765 0.293*   3.34* 5.3% 
 (0.47) (1.83)     
Model 2 3.702 -0.086 -0.761  3.00* 8.7% 
 (1.51) (-0.30) (-1.59)    
Model 3 0.282 0.307**  0.287* 3.42** 10.3% 
 (0.18) (1.96)  (1.82)   
 
Dependent Variable: European VC Fund Index Excess Return  (Average) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 -0.581 0.226**   6.15** 10.9% 
 (-0.63) (2.48)     
Model 2 1.246 -0.009 -0.474*  4.77** 15.2% 
 (0.90) (-0.06) (-1.75)    
Model 3 -0.984 0.238**  0.239** 7.51** 23.7% 
 (-1.13) (2.81)  (2.80)   
 
Dependent Variable: European VC Fund Index Excess Return  (Capital-weighted) 
 Constant Rmt Rmt* D Rj,t-1 F test Adjusted R
2
 
Model 1 -0.886 0.270**   7.14** 12.8% 
 (-0.86) (2.67)     
Model 2 1.121 0.011 -0.520*  5.26** 16.9% 
 (0.73) (0.06) (-1.74)    
Model 3 -1.380 0.284**  0.293** 9.45** 28.7% 
 (-1.47) (3.11)  (3.19)   
       
 
 
Note:  The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-
covariance estimator.  
 
** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% 
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Table VII 
 
Relationship between Venture Capital Excess Return  
and Benchmark Stock Market Excess Return: Before and After Euro.nm:  
 
jtmtjj1jt RR    
where Rjt is the excess return on venture capital fund index j in quarter t and Rm is the excess 
return on the market benchmark index.     
 
Panel A: US Venture Capital Quarterly Returns: 1993-1997 and 1998-2003 
 Constant Rmt F test Adjusted R
2
 
Period 1: 1993-1997 (Before Euro.NM) 
Pooled 3.368** 0.722** 10.35** 33.0% 
 (2.59) (3.22)   
Average 1.719** 0.249 2.52 7.4% 
 (1.90) (1.59)   
Capital-weighted 1.999** 0.505** 9.05** 29.8% 
 (2.06) (3.01)   
Period 2: 1998-2003 (After Euro.NM) 
Pooled 3.340 0.858** 7.24** 21.4% 
 (0.99) (2.69)   
Average -1.495 0.457** 11.95** 32.3% 
 (-1.07) (3.46)   
Capital-weighted -0.984 0.468** 11.00** 30.3% 
 (-0.66) (3.32)   
 
Panel B: European Venture Capital Quarterly Returns: 1993-1997 and 1998-2003 
 Constant Rmt F test Adjusted R
2
 
Period 1: 1993-1997 (Before Euro.NM) 
Pooled 3.835 -0.178 0.14 -4.8% 
 (1.27) (-0.37)   
Average 0.956 -0.019 0.00 -5.5% 
 (0.54) (-0.07)   
Capital-weighted 1.845 -0.012 0.00 -5.5% 
 (1.18) (-0.05)   
Period 2: 1998-2003 (After Euro.NM) 
Pooled -0.639 0.332** 3.79* 10.8% 
 (-0.31) (1.96)   
Average -1.636 0.227** 5.08** 15.1% 
 (-1.31) (2.25)   
Capital-weighted -2.593* 0.266** 5.19** 15.4% 
 (-1.79) (2.28)   
Note:  The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-
covariance estimator.  
** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% 
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Figure 1 
 
Efficient Frontiers:  Optimal allocations between stocks and venture capital  
Panel A. US 
Efficient Frontier: Public Equity and Venture Capital (pooled - US)
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Proportion in stocks: 33.22% 
Proportion in Venture Capital (using pooled return): 66.78% 
Expected Return of the optimal risky portfolio: 4.4% 
Standard Deviation of the optimal risky portfolio: 8.2% 
B. Europe 
Efficient Frontier: Public Equity and Venture Capital
 (pooled - Europe)
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Proportion in stocks: 74.3% 
Proportion in Venture Capital (using pooled return): 25.7% 
Expected Return of the optimal risky portfolio: 2.7% 
Standard Deviation of the optimal risky portfolio: 8.7% 
